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6 The Structuralist View of Measurement: An Extension of Received Measurement Theories 
Wolfgang Balzer' 
Seminar fur Philosophie, Logik, und Wissenschafistheorie 
Munchen, FRG 
There is a vast literature on measurement and on the relation to theory of mea- 
surement, experience, e ~ i d e n c e . ~  With few exceptions, these accounts have 
cases of simple, isolated, empirical, numerical hypotheses, like the ideal gas law, 
Ohm's law or Pythagoras' theorem, as their paradigm examples from which the 
general ideas are drawn and against which they are checked. However, scientific 
progress leads from those isolated beginnings to comprehensive networks of 
theories in which the systems originally studied form only small fragments. New 
devices of measurement are then introduced, and many (or even most) of the 
original methods of measurement are regarded as obsolete after a while. Such 
new devices of measurement often are quite different from the original methods. 
For instance, they often are "dependent" on the very same theory whose func- 
tions they determine-an idea hardly consistent with traditional concepts of 
measurement. The broader perspective of comprehensive theoretical networks 
and the practice of measurement in such broader contexts call for an extension of 
traditional views about measurement-an extension that may well necessitate 
some revision. 
The term "measurement" in ordinary as well as in current scientific language 
is ambiguous. Sometimes counting is included, sometimes numerical calcula- 
tions are excluded, sometimes concatenation, and sometimes experiment are 
regarded as necessary. A theory of measurement cannot perfectly match all these 
'Much preliminary work from which the structuralist view of measurement presented here finally 
developed was done in DFG project Ba 6781 1 and Ba 67812. I am indebted to B.  Lauth, R .  Niederie, 
and R .  D. Luce for critical comments and suggestions on the first draft. 
2For a selection, see the references in Berka (1983) and Krantz et al. (1971). 
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usages, simply because they are inconsistent. I will not be concerned here with 
defending my special use of the word measurement. Rather I am interested in a 
theory about those kinds of scientific practice that aim at the determination of 
particular features, properties, relations attached to special, prepared objects or 
events. These kinds of scientific practice provide an array of phenomena rich 
enough to justify metascientific theorizing-maybe even too rich, given the lack 
of success up to now-and they include the phenomena studied by traditional 
theories of measurement. 
This chapter is intended to sketch the basis for an extended concept of mea- 
surement that includes measurement in the context of big nets of theories as well 
as more "local," "fundamental," traditional situations. I cannot elaborate on the 
details and applications of this extended account; there are too many for this 
~ h a p t e r . ~  Instead I will concentrate on the way this account relates to and extends 
traditional approaches. 
I apologize for throwing together much outstanding and original work on 
measurement in one big pot to which the label "received view" is attributed, but 
I see no other possibility to arrive at a condensed, general comparison. Of course 
the particular label is chosen on purpose, although with a positive, "conser- 
vative" touch: What we received is a great heritage forming a solid fundament on 
which we can further build. 
THE RECEIVED VIEW OF MEASUREMENT 
Overview 
According to the received view, measurement consists, very roughly, of an 
assignment of numbers to concrete, empirical objects or events such that the 
assigned numbers (together with suitable standard mathematical operations) rep- 
resent the empirical objects or events (together with the empirical operations 
defined among them). In other words, for a given empirical structure consisting 
of a domain of concrete objects or events and concrete operations among these, 
measurement in a piecemeal fashion, establishes a mathematical structure con- 
sisting of a domain of numbers and abstract operations among these such that the 
mathematical structure represents the empirical one, which means that both 
structures are homomorphic or even isomorphic under a suitable mapping of 
empirical objects to mathematical objects. Often the empirical structure can be 
characterized by axioms expressing operationally testable propositions, and the 
existence of a homomorphism into a suitable mathematical structure can be 
proved from these axioms. The statement expressing the existence and uniqueness 
of such a homomorphism is then called a representation theorem, and the mapping 
3Compare Balzer (1983, 1985b) 
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from objects to numbers (or the whole class of these) is termed a scale. Among the 
empirical operations there will usually be a relation of order, and classes of such 
orderings (subject to further conditions) are called quantities. I will say that the 
values of a numerical function belong to a quantity, if the function represents 
empirical structures of which the quantity's orderings are parts. 
Historically this view may be traced back into antiquity. Euclid's axioms may 
be regarded as operationally testable statements about unspecified concrete oper- 
ations. That is, they become testable once suitable operations are specified. In 
fact, these axioms miss only little of the axioms in D3 below. In modem times, 
things got started again when Hoelder produced the first mathematically sound 
representation theorem (Holder, 1901), and this spread into applications of em- 
pirical sciences-most prominently of psychology. The classical modem for- 
mulation was achieved in Foundations of measurement by Krantz, Lucz, Suppes, 
and Tversky (1971), which expresses a strong, progressive research program. 
Recent developments have focused on the study of interlocked concatenation, 
conjoint systems, and a generalized notion of scale type (e.g., Luce and Narens, 
1985; Narens, 1985). I cannot do justice here to all the different individual 
contributions and expressions of the approach. 
In spite of individual differences, all (or most) authors seem to agree on the 
distinctive feature that measurement yields numerical representations of em- 
pirical structures. For this reason, the received view of measurement is usually 
called the representationalist view. 
This view of measurement is confirmed along several lines. First, numbers or 
mathematical objects allow for many manipulations that are impossible or at least 
difficult and inefficient to perform with concrete objects or events: Numbers can 
be compared according to their magnitude, and they can be added, multiplied, 
raised to the power, and so on. All this can be done without worrying about 
dimensions, about whether different numbers belong to the same quantity, and 
whether it makes sense to, say, add numbers belonging to different quantities. In 
this sense, numerical representations are an efficient means to unify and to make 
coherent scientific talk about and scientific practise dealing with concrete ob- 
jects, events, and operations. Second, in several cases, historical developments 
in fact led to the establishment of numerical representations. This holds for 
geometry, chronometry, kinematics, gravitational and inertial mass and tem- 
perature, to mention some important cases in which numerical representation is 
~ r u c i a l . ~  Third, it may be pointed out that numbers, after all, are nothing but 
"numerical representations" of empirical structures. So the representation of the 
latter in terms of numbers has a strong analytic f l a ~ o r . ~  
40ther examples for which representation theorems can be proved but for which the empirical 
structures are less reliable are found, for instance, in Krantz et al. (1971). 
SThis view I share with perhaps few philosophers of mathematics. See Balzer (1979). 
Fundamental Measurement 
Fundamental measurement begins at the individual level of concrete systems. Let 
us look at one such system that conceptualizes or captures just one single process 
of measurement in the course of which one value, to be called the measured 
value in the following, is determined. A paradigm is measurement of distance by 
means of rigid rods, and the measurement of one distance-value is concep- 
tualized as a process in which different copies of a unit-rod are put together 
(concatenated) until the two points in question can be connected by the concate- 
nated sequence of units. The distance is then "read off" by counting the minimal 
number of unit rods necessary in order to establish a connection. 
In general, such a system will involve concrete objects or events (like points 
marked on rigid bodies in the distance example, or processes in the measurement 
of time) as well as concrete operations among those objects or events (like 
concatenation and comparison of rigid rods). The operations can be classified 
into a certain, small number of few kinds, and by looking at many similar 
systems, several properties of the kinds of operations can be extracted and stated 
explicitly as axioms about the kinds of operations involved. These items, the 
domain D of objects, the kinds of concrete operations o ,  , . . . , or involved, and 
the axioms characterizing these operations make up what is called an empirical 
structure. This is a structure (D, o , ,  . . . , or) satisfying the axioms. 
However, in order to speak of measurement, representation is necessary. The 
empirical structure we find in some real system is matched by a numerical sfruc- 
ture ( R ,  m , ,  . . . , m,) where R is the set of real numbers, and each mi (i 5 r )  is a 
relation of the same type over R as is oi over D. The numerical structure ( R ,  
m , ,  . . . , m,) is said to represent the empirical structure (D, o , ,  . . . , or), iff 
there is a mapping o: D -, R ,  which is a homomorphism with respect to the rela- 
tions on both sides. Altogether the conceptualization of a concrete system as a sys- 
tem capturing some process of measurement yields an entity of the following form: 
(i.e., an empirical structure together with a numerical structure and some homo- 
morphism o between both). Let us call any such entity a system of fundamental 
measurement. 
Here is a simple e ~ a m p l e . ~  
Dl  (a). x is a model of length measurement with units U iff there exist D, <, o 
and o such that x = ((D, 5,  o), (R, , +), o) and the following holds: 
1 .  D i s a s e t a n d a Z  U c D .  
2. < D x D is transitive, reflexive, and connected. 
61n Dl and D3 below and the corresponding proofs, I use the following notation: "a -- b for "a 
< b and b 5 a," "a < b" for "a 5 b and not b 5 a", "x(o')" for the result of substituting w' in x for 
o, and "na" for "ao . . . oa" (n-times). R +  and N denote the sets of positive reals and of natural 
numbers respectively. 
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3. o is a partial function from D x D to D and is associative. 
4. For all a ,  b, c E D for which a o b, a o c, b o c are defined: 
a < a o b , a n d ( a _ i b ,  i f f a o c _ i b o c ,  i f f c o a _ i c o b )  
5. Foral lb ,  b ' E  U : b =  b'. 
6. For all a E D, there exist b,, . . . , b, E U such that b, o . . . o b, is 
defined, and b, o . . . o b, = a. 
7. o: D + R and the following holds for all a ,  b E D: 
7.1. a 5 b, iff w(a) 5 w(b). 
7.2. o (a  o b) = w(a) + o(b) (when a o b is defined). 
(b). x is a model of length measurement iff there exists some U such that x is a 
model of length measurement with units U. 
T1 (a). If x is a model of length measurement with units U and with units U' ,  
then for all b, b': if b E U and b' E U' then b = b'. 
(b). Ifx = (,(D, 5, o), (R, 5, +), o)andxf  = ((D, 5,  o), (R, 5, +), wl)are 
models of length measurement, then there exists a E R + such that for all 
a E D: o(a) + a.of(a).  
(c). If (D, 5, 0) and U are such that D l a l  to 6 are satisfied, then there exists 
o: D + R such that a-7 is satisfied and o is uniquely determined up to 
some a E Rf. 
The proofs of this and the other theorems are given in the appendix. 
Of course, by considering just one, single, real system, one hardly would end 
up with a system of fundamental measurement. In reality, many different but 
similar systems exist and are taken into consideration. Only on the basis of a 
large number of similar systems or situations is it possible to extract axioms for 
empirical structures that express observed regularities. The natural basis for the 
description of fundamental measurement, therefore, is given not by single sys- 
tems but rather by classes of such systems. I will call them fundamental measure- 
ment classes. 
D2 X is a fundamental measurement class (with respect to transformations of type 
T), iff there is a set-theoretic formula F such that the following holds: 
1. F can be validated in structures of the form ((D, o,, . . . , or), (R, 
m,, . . . , m,), o )  and F expresses (among other things) empirical reg- 
ularities about (D, o,, . . . , or). 
2. X is the class of all structures in which F is valid. 
3. For all D, o, ,  . . , or, m,, . . , m,, o ,  if F(D, o,, . . , or, m,, . . , m,, w), 
then the following holds: 
3.1. o,, . . . , or can be interpreted by concrete operations. 
3.2. o is a homomorphism from (D, o,, . . . , or) to (R, m,, . . . , mr). 
3.3. o is uniquely determined up to transformations of type T (that is, every 
other homomorphism from (D, . . . , or) to (R, . . . , m,) is obtained 
from o by some transformation of type 7). 
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Condition (3.3) may seem redundant to some representationalists, because it 
usually follows as a theorem from appropriate axioms about o,, . . . , or. How- 
ever, in the general case, there may be a considerable multiplicity of scales w 
satisfying the other requirements of D2, that is, w may be determined only up to 
rather general transformations. If we imagine a system of fundamental measure- 
ment to describe some real process of measurement, we expect specific numer- 
ical values to be produced. However, if w is determined only up to very general 
transformations (like monotonic transformations), we will not get definite val- 
ues. Some authors would still speak of measurement in such a case. What 
matters for them is representation, not determination. However, in practice, 
determination is most important, and D2 (3.3) may help to keep us aware of that. 
Fundamental measurement classes have further interesting properties. Let 
us write Dx, ox, o", and so on for the various components of a system x = 
((D,o,. . . ,w ) and also Ux for the set of units occurring in Dl .  For a given 
fundamental measurement class X, let us define the join of X, UX, as the 
structure ( U Dx, U ox,.  . . , U o" ). On the operational level, the join, 
x E X  xEX XEX 
of, say, two systems may simply be a conceptual artifact (think of two distance 
measurements in completely disjoint systems), or it may be an extension of the 
joined systems (e.g., if we measure by rigid rods the distance from el to e, in one 
system s,; from e, to e, in a second system s,; and from el to e, in the system s, 
obtained by joining s, and s,). On the numerical level, the join of two systems 
yields an additional constraint on the choice of representing numbers; only those 
assignments are admissible that assign the same numbers to objects occurring 
simultaneously in different systems (the distance between e, and e, in s , ,  for 
instance, must be the same as between el and e ,  in the extended system s,). 
Formally such a constraint can be stated as a property of a fundamental 
measurement class X. X satisfies the constraint iff, for any two systems, 
x=((D,. . .),. . . ,w), xr=((Dr,.  . .),. . ,wr ) E X, the following holds: For all ob- 
jects a E D fl D r  , the representing numbers w(a) and wl(a) with respect to x and 
xr are the same-w(a) = wr(a). In other words, the numerical representation 
w(a) of an object a in a system x must not change when a is considered from the 
point of view of some other system xr .  In measurement of distances, this 
amounts, among other things, to the requirement that some unit-rod in one 
system should also be a unit-rod in any other system. Expressed still differently, 
the constraint says that, in the join of any two systems x, z EX, the numerical 
assignment o' U wz in fact is a function: o" U wz: Dx U Dz-, [W. Similarly if we 
take the join of all of X, U X, we still have a function U ox: U LP + [W.7 
*EX xEX 
Usually the join UX of a fundamental measurement class will not capture any 
'See Balzer (1978), for applications of this kind and of other kinds of constraints to the case of 
geometry. 
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concrete process of measurement. Rather it captures a whole domain of objects to 
which some given measurement procedure can be applied. In the technical liter- 
ature, such idealized universal systems play a dominant role for the standard, 
elegant representation theorems can be proved only for the idealized systems.* 
As a typical example, let us just cite the closed extensive positive systems of 
Krantz et al. (1971, p. 73). 
D3 (a). x is a closed extensive positive structure iff there exist D, <, o such that x 
= (D,  <, o) and the following holds: 
1 .  D is a nonempty set. 
2. < D X D is transitive, reflexive, and connected. 
3. o: D X D + D is associative. 
4. Foralla, b , c E D : a ~ a o b , a n d ( a < b i f f a o c < b o c i f f c o a < c  
0 b). 
5. For all a ,  b, c, d E D: if a < b, then there is n E N such that na o c 5 
nb o d. 
(b). x is an idealized model of length measurement iff there exist D,  <, o and 
o such that x = ( (D,  <, o), ( R ,  5, +), o )  and the following holds: 
1. (D,  5, o) is a closed extensive positive structure. 
2. w: D + R .  
3. For all a, b E D: (a < b iff o(a) < w(b)) and o ( a  o b) = o(a) + o(b). 
(a). If (D,  <, o) is a closed extensive positive structure, then there exists w 
such that ( (D,  <, o), (58, 5, +), w) is an idealized model of length 
measurement and w is determined uniquely up to some cr E R+. 
(b). If X is a class of models for length measurement such that the following 
holds: (i) for all x, u E X, there exists a common extension9 z E X; (ii) 
for all x E X and all a ,  b E D such that a < b, there is some u E X such 
that u is an extension of x; and there is some n E N such that, in u, b < 
na; (iii) UxEXoX is a total function, then U X is an idealized model 
of length measurement. 
Clearly closed extensive positive structures do not capture single processes of 
measurement. They are most naturally regarded as the join of an appropriate 
fundamental measurement class. In T2, some rather strong sufficient conditions 
for this are stated. lo  
8There are less elegant systems that apply also to unidealized finite systems, like the one in Dl 
above, or the one in Krantz et al. (1971, p. 103). 
T h a t  z is an extension of x means that D Dz, and ix and ol are the restrictions of iz and oz to 
D respectively. 
'OIt seems to be worthwhile studying this case and looking for weaker conditions that are 
necessary too. 
Derived Measurement and the Structure of Science 
Fundamental measurement occurs in science whenever a new range of phe- 
nomena for the first time is approached in a quantitative way. However, when 
one or several theories are established in some domain, new concepts of a 
theoretical nature will be introduced in order to get a more efficient organization 
of the available data. Often such new concepts will not be accessible to funda- 
mental measurement in a straightforward way; they are determined by derived 
measurement. Derived measurement of a function simply consists of an explicit 
definition of this function in terms of other functions that are accessible to 
fundamental measurement, of measuring appropriate values of these latter func- 
tions, and of calculating the desired value(s) of the defined function from the 
measured values according to the given definition. 
Consider the trivial example of velocity. The quantitative notion of velocity 
was introduced after quantitative concepts of spatial and temporal distance had 
developed. Velocity cannot be measured fundamentally-at least not in any 
straightforward way-and the same holds for mean velocity. The first step in the 
development of the notion was to define mean velocity as spatial distance trav- 
elled divided by time needed. In order to measure mean velocity, one has to 
measure (say, fundamentally) spatial and temporal distances and to apply the 
definition to the values, thus, obtained. 
This account yields a nice and precise picture of the general structure of 
science: "Basic" terms, which can be fundamentally measured, are introduced in 
the beginning, and the vocabulary of science is enlarged step-by-step by intro- 
ducing new terms definable by those that are antecendently available or by 
introducing new terms that can be fundamentally measured. Nice though it may 
be, this picture does not show how science actually develops. Usually new 
concepts are not explicitly defined, the previous example of velocity being one of 
the rare exceptions.ll The discussions about theoretical terms in logical em- 
piricism, as well as recent formal results about theoreticity12 provide sufficient 
evidence here. 
Recent work on measurement in conjoint systems13 suggests that the question 
of definability in connection with derived measurement may be less central. The 
procedure just outlined might be replaced by some fundamental method directly 
producing the "defined" quantity; under suitable conditions, this direct represen- 
tation can be decomposed multiplicatively. At present, there are only few, real- 
life examples of conjoint measurement, and these are mainly initiated by the 
development of the abstract notion. Still one could insist that derived measure- 
ment in principle might be replaced by conjoint measurement and that the dis- 
"A more typical example is found in D4 below where the condition eligible for a definition (D4- 
a-5) does not guarantee uniqueness. 
'2See Balzer (1985a, 1986) and Gaehde (1983). 
'3Compare, for instance, Luce & Narens (1985), Narens & Luce (1986). 
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tance between scientific practice and the picture emerging from derived measure- 
ment, therefore, is artificial. However, replacing derived measurement by 
conjoint measurement would not bring us closer to scientific practise. In the 
natural sciences, there is a large class of methods of measurement that simply are 
not of the conjoint type. 
In any case, the picture of the structure of science emerging from the represen- 
tationalist view is not the most adequate one, and my claim is that the struc- 
turalist view of measurement provides a more adequate one. 
THE STRUCTURALIST VlEW OF MEASUREMENT 
Overview 
According to the structuralist view, measurement consists in determining a datum 
(function value, truth value), which, on a regular pattern, is uniquely given by 
other, known, or available data. If all the data are represented as values of real 
valued functions, the regular pattern will usually be represented by a mathe- 
matical equation, and the determination of the value one is looking for (the 
measured value) amounts to its calculation from other, presupposed values by 
"solving the equation." 
Let us start analyzing this picture at the level of single systems-as in the first 
case. What we have before us is a concrete process of measurement that, after 
some suitable preparations, consists of the development of a real system until the 
measured value is produced. Such a system is distinguished from it's environ- 
ment as sharply as we are able to separate different systems in different situa- 
tions-an ability that we may safely assume in the present context. Further, it 
usually is not too difficult to determine two instants marking the "beginning" 
and the "end" of the process of measurement (which need not be unique). If we 
start to conceptualize the system that is given by the process, we see that there 
are already some (one or several, but few) theoretical pictures, theories, that can 
be used for the conceptualization. We assume that the system at hand is a model 
of that theory or theories. Such a model capturing or conceptualizing or describ- 
ing a real system that is given by some process of measurement I call a measur- 
ing model. Clearly, if a process of measurement involves more than one theory 
for its description, we may analyze it and deal with various subprocesses, each of 
which yields just one model of a theory (i.e., just one measuring model). I will 
not go into the question here of how to put together the various measuring 
models, thus, obtained in order to provide a complete description of the original 
process; in the following, I will deal only with processes that are governed or can 
be described by just one theory.14 
As an example, let us consider the measurement of mass by means of colli- 
'4Cornpare Balzer (1985b) and Balzer and Wollrnershaeuser (1986), for studies of more complex 
situations. 
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sions.15 Consider three particles colliding with each other at one instant. Their 
velocities before and after the collision are approximately constant and are mea- 
sured by suitable means. Furthermore, let us assume that the velocity vectors 
have some special geometrical configuration: the vectors of velocity differences 
(before and after the collision, for each particle) are such that it is not possible to 
have a plane passing through the origin of the three vectors and all three vectors 
lying on one side of the plane-D4(a)(6) below. In this situation, the law of 
conservation of total momentum-which is the central axiom of collision me- 
chanics-allows us to calculate the particles' mass-ratios from their velocities. l6  
D4 (a). x is a measuring model for mass by collisions (with respect to p,) iff 
there exist P, T, v, m such that x = (P, T, R, v, m) and the following 
holds: 
1. P is a three-element set (of "particles") andp, E P (we write P = (p,, 
Pz' ~31) .  
2. T = {b, a )  is a two-element set ("before" and "after"). 
3. v: P X T -+ a83 (velocity function). 
4. m: P + R+ (mass function). 
5. CPEp m@)v@, b) = CPEp m@)v@, a) 
(law of conservation of momentum). 
6. the subspace of R3 generated by w,, w,, w3 has two dimensions and 
there is no u E [W3 such that the following holds: 
6.1. F o r a l l i E { I , 2 , 3 ) : w * u ~ O .  
6.2. There is some i E (1, 2, 3) such that w * u > 0. 
7. m@,) = 1. 
(b). x is a measuring model for mass-ratios by collision iff x = (P, T, R, v, m) 
is, as in part a) and D4 (a) (1) to (a) (6), are satisfied with respect to some 
PI .  
T3 (a). If (P, T, R, v, m) and (P, T, R, v, m*) are measuring models for mass by 
collisions with respect t o p , ,  then m = m*. 
(b). If (P, T, R, v, m) and (P, T, [W, v, m*) are measuring models for mass- 
ratios by collisions then there is an a E R+ such that for all p E P: 
m@) = a-m*@). 
Measuring Models 
In general, the idea of a measuring model comprises five features-all present in 
the previous example. First, the system captured by the measuring model satis- 
I5See Balzer & Muehlhoelzer (1982), for a complete survey of all possible measuring models for 
mass in collision mechanics. The simplest case of collision along a straight line is avoided on 
purpose. 
161n D4 and the corresponding proofs, I write wi, for v@;, a )  - v b i ,  b), i = 1, 2, 3, and u*s for 
CiS3 uisi where u = ( u , ,  U Z ,  u3) and s = ( s , ,  s2 ,  s3) .  
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fies some law-like the law of conservation of total momentum in D4 (a) (5). In 
general, we may suppose that the system under consideration gives rise to a 
structure x of the following form: 
where D l ,  . . . , D, are sets of objects, A,, . . . , A, are sets of mathematical 
entities (like real numbers), and R,, . . . , R, are relations "over" D l ,  . . . , D,, 
A , ,  . . . , A, l7 that is, x is a structure of type (k, m, a , ,  . . . , a,). The law that 
holds in the given system may be expressed by some set-theoretic formula 
B(zl, . . . , z,+,+,) containing at least the free variables z,, . . . , z,+,+, 
such that D l ,  . . . , D,, A,, . . . , A, R,, . . . , R, are of the same types as 
Z, , . . . , zk+, +, respectively. We then say that B has the type of x and B's 
validity in x then simply is stated by B(x) or B(D,, . . . , R,).18 
Second, in each measuring model, the function one wants to measure is 
uniquely determined by means of the other "parts" (functions and sets of objects) 
of the model and by the law that holds in the model. In the last example, this 
condition is expressed by T3 (a). It may be still further formalized by letting 
"B(P, T, R, v, m)" stand for "(P, . . . , m) is a measuring model for mass by 
collisions." That m is uniquely determined by P, T, R, v, and statement B then 
amounts to19 the following: 
V m V m* (B(P, . . . , v, m) B(P, . . . , v, m) + m = m ) * 0  (1) 
"For each r E N, we define syntactic r-types by induction: For each i E N ,  i 5 r, we let [i] be an 
r-type, and, if 71, 7 2  are r-types, then so are (r l  @ 72) and  pow^^). For each r-type, T and given 
sets S1, . . . , S,, we define the echelon set r(Slr . . . , Sr) by induction. If 7 is some [i], then 
?(S1, . . . , Sr) is Si, and, if r,{S1, . . . , Sr) is already defined for j = 1 , 2 ,  then @ 72) (S1, . . . , 
S,) is TI  (Sir . . . , Sr) X T ~ ( S ~ .  . . . , SF), and (pow 71) (SI, . . . , S,) is P O ( T ~ ( S ~ ,  . . . , Sr)). R is a 
relation over S I ,  . . . , S,, iff there is some r-type T such that R C (pow?) (SI, . . . , S,). x is a 
structure of type (k, m, u l ,  . . . , a,), iff k, m E N, n 2 1, u l ,  . . . , a, are (k + m)-types, andx = 
(Dl, . . . , Dk; Al,  . . . ,A,; Rl ,  . . . , R,) where D l ,  . . . , Dk are sets, Al,  . . . ,A, are sets of 
mathematical objects, and each R, is a relation over D l ,  . . . , Dk, Al,  . . . , A,. 
These definitions originally are found-with small deviations and in different notation-in 
Bourbaki (1968, pp. 259). In the following, for x = (Dl, . . . , Dk; A,, . . . , A,; R1, . . . , R,), 
and i 5 n, we write x-i  for the result of omitting Ri in x, and X-~[R] for the result of substituting Ri in 
x by R (provided always that Ri and R are of the same (k  + m)-type). Also we write Rfin order to 
denote the ith relation Ri occuning in x. 
lsAllowing for higher-order relations R covers those cases that in first-order formulations involve 
infinitely many axioms or that in infinitary logic involve infinitely long "formulas." The distinction 
between "proper objects" and "mathematical entities" represented by D l ,  . . . , Dk and Al, . . . , 
A, respectively is taken from Bourbaki and is mainly of practical importance here. Compare Balzer 
(1985b, chap. 11). 
19P, T, R, and v may be set theoretically regarded as free variables. 
20Note that, in general, this condition is quite different from the one stating that m is a function 
that is formalized by V p ,  p '  E P(p = p'  + m e )  = m(pl)), or, more explicitly 
( I*)  Vp,  p '  E P V a, p E R ((p, a)  E m A  (p', p) E m A p  = p' + a = p). It is only in the 
"limit case" of P being a singleton that (1) follows from (I*) .  Intuitively (1) states 
the uniqueness of a set (of pairs of arguments and function values), whereas (I*) states the 
104 BALZER 
In the general notation used previously, uniqueness of Ri in structure x = 
(Dl, . . . , R,) is expressed as follows: 
v R*(B(D,, . . . , R,) A B(D,, . . . , Rip R*, Ri+ . . . , R,,) + Ri = 
R*). (2) 
If it is relation Ri (which I always take to be a function, if necessary by switching 
to the characteristic function) that is uniquely determined in the measuring model 
x, I will say that x is a measuring model for the i-th relation (i 5 n). 
A third feature common to measuring models is that the function to be mea- 
sured is determined uniquely only up to certain transformations by the law 
involved. In the example of D4 (a) above, one particle was required to have unit 
mass, D4 (a) (7). Usually, such requirements that refer to units or origins simply 
are omitted in the description of a measuring model with the effect that the 
function under consideration no longer is uniquely determined. The effect for 
uniqueness of omitting reference to units can be accounted for by weakening 
uniqueness to uniqueness-up-to-transformations-of-scale of a predetermined 
type. In the example of D4, the effect for uniqueness of dropping reference to a 
unit-mass, D4 (a) (7), is that the mass function m is no longer uniquely deter- 
mined but is determined only up to a positive real number, T3 (b). The measuring 
model for mass-ratios by collision, D4 (b), thus, obtained is more realistic with 
respect to scientific practice, because it also covers those cases in which the 
process of measurement-the process of collision-does not involve a unit 
mass. This situation is acceptable, because still something reasonably accessible 
is uniquely determined: mass-ratios. If mass-ratios can be determined from ve- 
locities, one may eventually obtain "absolute" mass values by measuring the 
mass of one of the particles involved by means of another measuring model, 
different from the one at hand. 
Here the general problem arises of what to regard as the right transformation 
of scale. There are quite a number of different, "established" transformations to 
be found in the literature. Obviously, the more general transformations for a 
function we admit, the less determination of that function we can achieve in a 
measuring model. For the time being, I will restrict considerations to linear 
transformations (more on this below). Iff: D + N, and f ' :  D' + N', we say that 
f '  is obtained from f by a linear transf~rrnation~~ (abbreviated by f '  = j), iff 
either (D = D', N = N', and there exist a ,  p E R, a > 0 such that, for all a E 
D: f '(a) = af(a) + P) or f = f '. The weaker condition of uniqueness that results 
from (2) above, thus, is the following: 
vR*(B(Dl, . . . , R,) A B P I ,  . . . , Rip] ,  R*, Riel, . . . , R,) -+ R~ = 
R*) (3) 
uniqueness of function values-which may be construed as components of elements of 
the sets occurring in (I) .  
21This definition can be easily extended to functions taking values in vector spaces 
over ordered fields. 
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That is, if (Dl, . . . , R,) is a measuring model for the i-th relation, and, if, by 
replacing R, by some R*, we still have a measuring model for the i-th relation, 
then R* is obtained from Ri by a linear transformation. In other words, the 
function R, to be determined in measuring model (Dl, . . . , R,) is determined 
by the law B and by the other "parts" Dl ,  . . . , Ri-I , R,+ ,, R, of the measur- 
ing model up to a linear transformation. 
The fourth feature inherent in measuring models is that the measured value, or 
more generally, the function of which this value is a function value, can be 
computed from the other "parts" of the measuring model. This means that, for 
each argument a, the function value R,(a) can be computed from appropriate 
values of the other functions R,,  . . . , R,- , , R,, , , . . . , R,. The computation 
has to start with a finite input; thus, only finitely many values Rj(a,) (j = 
1, . . . , n, j # i, s 5 t for some t E N) will be needed. That is, the computation 
of the measured value does not really use "all of" the other functions but only 
some finite parts of them. This idea may be formalized by means of a rather 
general notion of a substructure. If x = (D,, . . . , D,; A,, . . . , A,; R,, . . . , 
R,) is a structure of type 7 = (k, m, a , ,  . . , a,), then z = (D;, . . . , DL; 
A;, . . . , A; R;, . . . , R 2  is a substructure.of x iff for all i 5 k: Di c D,; for 
all i 5 m: A,! C A,; and for all i 5 n: R: C R,, and z again is a structure of type 7. 
The requirement of computability of the measured value in a measuring model x 
= (Dl, . . . , R,) for the i-th relation then can be stated as follows. For each a in 
the domain of R,, there is a finite substructure z, of x, (see footenote 17) such that 
R,(a) is computable from z,. In order to link this notion to the standard notion of 
computability, some further encoding of R,(a) and of z, will be necessary, but it 
will depend on the particular case, and not much can be said about it in general. 
Usually the computations arise in a natural way from the law B that governs 
the measuring model. Often this law consists of a simple equation that can be 
solved for the measured value R,(a) (as in the example of weight measurement 
following). In other cases, the computation may involve some mathematics. The 
computation of mass values in the case of the example from D4 involves linear 
algebra in order to solve the system of linear equations given by the basic law 
(see the proof of T4). 
A final feature of measuring models is that the measured value in fact depends 
on the other parts of the model. In the conceptual frame used here, function R, 
might be defined in a purely mathematical way. A real valued function R,: Dl  + 
R could be defined, for example, by: R, (a) = 5 for all a E D. Such an R, would 
satisfy the requirement of uniqueness, but the measured value R, (a) would be 
mathematically defined, and there would be no need for measurement. Such 
cases are excluded by requiring that R, in fact changes when the other parts of the 
model change. Here topological concepts come into play. Consider the following 
relation 8, given by the formula B that characterizes a measuring model: 8,(u, 
v), iff there is x such that B(x), u = x P i  and v = R;. Factorizing 8, modulo .= in 
its second argument yields a relation 8; given by 8; (u, v) iff there is x such that 
B(x), u = x-, and R; E v. If B determines R, in x up to linear transformations, 
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then 8; will be a function. Now purely mathematical definitions of Ri as the one 
mentioned above might be excluded just by saying that 8," is not constant. Still, 
this seems to leave room for ad  hoc definitions that really do not involve mea- 
surement. A stronger and more adequate requirement is that 8; be a continuous, 
nonconstant function, continuity being defined relative to some natural to- 
pologies introduced on the domain and range of 8," by a given topology on the 
class {xlB(x)) of all measuring models given by B. In the example of D4, such 
topologies are given by the distances of the function values IvX(p, a) - vz(p, a)] 
and IW(~)  - mz(p)l for the v- and m-functions in different models x, z (in which 
the sets P and T are the same). 
Summing up these features, we obtain the following: 
D5 (a). x is a measuring model (for the i-th relation) characterized by B and + iff 
there exist D l ,  . . . , D,, A,, . . . , A,, R,, . . . , R, such that x = (Dl ,  
. . , D,, A,, . . , A, R,, . . , R,) and the following holds: 
1 .  i s n .  
2 .  B is a set theoretic statement of a law; B is of the type of x and B is 
valid in x. 
3. I) is a topology on {xlB(x)). 
4. For all R*: if B(D,, . . . , R,) and 
B(D,, . . . , R ,-,, R*, R,,,, . . . , R,), then R, = R*. 
5. For all a in the domain of R, there is a finite substructure za of 
(Dl, . . . , Ri- ,, Ri+ ,, . . . , R,) such that Ri(a) is computable "up 
to =" from za (after appropriate encoding). 
6. relation 0; is a continuous function (relative to suitable topologies 
induced by IJI) and not constant. 
(b). x is a measuring model (for the i-th relation) iff there exist B and (I such 
that x is a measuring model (for the i-th relation) characterized by B and 
*. 
Methods of Measurement 
As before, consideration of a single system is unlikely to lead us to a measuring 
model, because it will hardly reveal law-like features as required in D5 (a) (2). In 
reality a large number of real systems has to be studied and compared with each 
other so that a regularity can be detected and a law formulated correspondingly. 
A more natural basis for the definition of measuring models, therefore, is given 
by a class of systems or, after conceptualization, by a class of structures. 
D6 2 is a method of measurement (for the i-th relation) iff there exist B and IJ 
such that the following holds: 
1. B is a set theoretic formula that can be interpreted in structures of the form 
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D l  . . . , D A , ,  . . . , A R . . . , R )  i n, and B expresses a 
law. 
2. 9 is the class of all structures in which B is valid. 
3. Each x E B is a measuring model for the i-th relation characterized by B 
and JI. 
4. 3 contains (descriptions of) many real systems. 
D6 (1) and (3) just rephrase D5. D6 (4) is intended to exclude contrived, abstract 
examples. We speak of a method here in the following, derived sense. For each 
proper method of measurement, we can think of the class of all cases in which 
the method might be applied successfully. Each such case would yield a real 
system, given either by the process of applying the method or by the result of 
having the method applied. In this way, each method of measurement corre- 
sponds to a class of systems, and we decide to call this class itself a method of 
measurement. 
Obviously the requirements of B being a law and of 2 containing many real 
systems cannot be formalized. They tie the notion of a method of measurement to 
pragmatics and to "reality." What is a law can only be made out on the basis of 
theoretically minded human interaction, and what is a (description of a) real 
system can be made out only by some reference to experience. We cannot expect 
the notion of a method of measurement to be definable more formally than the 
notion of an empirical theory, simply because we want methods of measurement 
to cover cases governed by proper theoretical laws (which occur in established 
theories) as well as cases of fundamental measurement in which the law charac- 
terizing the measuring models is not a law of any established theory. 
Examples 
1. The classes 2, and 2, of all measuring models for mass and mass-ratios 
by collisions are methods of measurement (for the second relation). 
2. If we rearrange the components in models of length measurement like this: 
(D; R; I, +, <, o, o), the class of all models of length measurement yields a 
method of measurement 2, for the fifth relation. 
3. Let 2, be the class of all structures (P; T, R; s, m, f,, . . , f,) for which 
there exist p, ,  p,, p, ("earth," "particle the weight of which is measured," 
"particle marking the origin"), all distinct, such that the following: (a) P = (p,, 
p2, p,); (b) T C R is an open interval (set of "instants"); (c) s: P X T + R3 is 
smooth ("position function"); (d) m: P + R +  ("mass function"); (e) for all i 5 
n:f ,:  P x T+ R3 ("force functions"); (f) there is k E R +  such that, for all t E 
T: f,(p2, t) = -k(s(p3, t) - s(p2, t)) ("Hooke's law"); (g) for all t E T: f,(p2, t) 
= -f2(p2, t) ("actio-reactio law," specialized top,); (h) for all t E T: f,(p,, t) = 
f2(p3, t) = 0. Elements of 2, capture measurements of weight (= f,@,, t)) under 
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the following interpretati~n:,~ f, denotes gravitational force and f2 Hooke's force 
exerted in a system in which p, (some object) is hung on a spring balance (where 
p, marks the end of the spring in the unextended case). Clearly function f2 is 
uniquely determined in members of z,, and 2, is a method of measurement (for 
the fourth relation). 
Note that the class of all closed extensive positive structures would not be a 
good candidate for a method of measurement because of D6 (4). There are no 
real systems that can be described in terms of D4. 
Unlike the notion of fundamental measurement, the notions of a measuring 
model and of a method of measurement are neutral with respect to the structure of 
science. They fit in naturally into the picture of science as a web or a net of 
structures, models, or theories. Measuring models can be treated on a par with 
models of theories, and methods of measurement on a par with classes of models 
of theories. According to the most sophisticated notion available,,, one main 
constituent of an empirical theory is a net consisting of a class of models and of 
various subclasses, ("specializations"). Methods of measurement are just a par- 
ticular kind of such specializations. In this picture, no priority is given to "direct 
observation" or to distinguished forms of measurement. 
COMPARISON 
Having outlined the basic features of the representationalist and the structuralist 
view of measurement, we now can compare the two. 
First, let us compare the notions of a fundamental measurement class and of a 
method of measurement as given by D2 and D6. A fundamental measurement 
class is a class of systems of fundamental measurement; that is, a class of 
structures characterized by certain axioms and so is a method of measurement 
(D2 (2) and D6 (2)). The axioms for empirical structures in systems of funda- 
mental measurement have to be grounded in empirical regularities and so have 
the axioms characterizing the measuring models D2 ( I )  and D6 (1). In systems of 
fundamental measurement, there is the representing homomorphism w that is 
determined uniquely up to specified transformations. In measuring models, there 
is the corresponding requirement that the function to be measured be determined 
uniquely up to some specified transformation D2 (3.3) and D6 (3). The require- 
ments of computability and of proper dependence inherent in D6 (3) usually also 
are satisfied in systems of fundamental measurement-although not required 
explicitly. 
Besides these correspondences, there are the following differences. Systems 
22See Balzer and Moulines (1980). 
23(Balzer, Moulines, & Sneed, 1987, chap. IV). 
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of fundamental measurement have an inner structure more specific than that of 
measuring models. They have to consist of two "smaller" structures (the em- 
pirical and the mathematical one) and a homomorphism between those. No such 
requirement is present for measuring models. In this respect, measuring models 
are much more general. Furthermore, the empirical relations in systems of funda- 
mental measurement have to represent concrete operations, whereas, on the side 
of measuring models, no distinction among the relations R, ,  . . . , R, (like 
observational-theoretical or concrete-abstract) is required. In this respect also, 
measuring models are more general. 
This indicates that methods of measurement are more general than systems of 
fundamental measurement. There is, however, a little difficulty. As noted pre- 
viously, the idealized systems of fundamental measurement do not describe real 
systems, and if we consider corresponding classes of such systems as candidates 
for methods of measurement, usually D6 (4) will not be satisfied. There are two 
remarks to that point. First, one might simply drop D6 (4) and, thus, eliminate 
the difficulty. This might be justified by saying that, for the sake of comparison, 
we are primarily interested in the conceptual structure of measuring models. I do 
not regard this as an adequate reaction. Rather I would remark secondly that the 
transition from the representationalist to the structuralist view is not completely 
smooth. It seems to involve a kind of "Kuhn-loss," and what is lost are precisely 
those superidealized structures that have no real applications. As soon as approx- 
imation is brought into play, an analogue to approximative reduction perhaps 
would be appropriate to describe the relation between the two approaches. 
A second dimension of comparison is that of implications for the structure of 
science. It seems that the structuralist view fits better with the actual, overall 
structure of empirical science than does the received view that has some difficul- 
ties "getting off the ground" of empirical structures and systems of fundamental 
measurement. We may say that the structuralist view frees philosophy of science 
from dogmatic assumptions of logical empiricism without loss of potential of 
drawing a fine-grained picture of science.24 
Finally it has to be stressed that the structuralist view covers both kinds of 
representationalist measurement: fundamental as well as derived (or conjoint) 
measurement. It does so by substantial generalization. In connection with funda- 
mental measurement, one result of this generalization is that the distinction 
between a qualitative ("empirical") and a quantitative (numerical) level van- 
ishes. In connection with derived measurement, the greater generality of measur- 
ing models is obvious. Derived measurement requires a definition, whereas, in 
measuring models, only some law-like connection is required. The law B in a 
measuring model need not be suited as a general definition of the term to be 
measured. 
24It is not difficult, for instance, to draw the hierarchical picture of science within the 
structuralist view. 
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If we use the term "extension" in a broad way that does not allow "parts" of 
the representationalist account to be properly included in the extended account 
but to be only captured by the structuralist view in the limit, then these considera- 
tions may be summarized by stating that the structuralist view is a proper and 
essential extension of the representationalist view of measurement. 
PERSPECTIVES AND PROBLEMS 
In the section, The Structuralist View of Measurement, only the most basic 
features of the structuralist view were sketched. When implemented in the se- 
mantic or the structuralist approach to theories, the structuralist view of measure- 
ment opens up a wide range.of applications. In this final section, I want at least 
briefly to touch on some achievements, possibilities, and problems of this view. 
Its most definite achievement consists in the development of a formal defini- 
tion of theoreticity that yields a formal distinction between T-theoretical and T- 
nontheoretical terms in any axiomatized theory T. The definition evolved from 
investigations of measurement under the structuralist view, and it yields the 
expected distinctions when applied to axiomatized versions of real-life theories. 
Moreover, this definition for the first time opens a way for empirical and precise 
studies of the global structure of science-in contrast to logical empiricism or the 
received view that both simply postulate and presuppose a hierarchical structure. 
The new definition of theoreticity being available in the literature, there is no 
need to go into the details here (see footnote 12). 
A second achievement consists in complete accounts of complicated measure- 
ments involving several intermediate steps (preliminary measured values) and 
several different theories to account for these steps. A simple example is pro- 
vided by the measurement of mass by collisions: In order to obtain the desired 
mass-values, we have to measure velocities, that is, intervals of space and time. 
So the whole process of measurement may be divided into several subprocesses: 
one for each measurement of a distance in space or time, and one consisting of 
the whole process. In total, three different kinds of phenomena and three corre- 
sponding theories are involved: phenomena of spatial distance, of distance in 
time, and of the inertial behavior of moving particles. The masses are calculated 
from "presupposed" values of velocities by means of collision mechanics, 
whereas the presupposed velocity values themselves are calculated from other, 
"presupposed" values of distances and times, which in turn are measured by 
means of geometric and chronometric devises (i.e., by means involving geome- 
try and chronometry). A full analysis yields a whole chain of values obtained 
from iterated calculations of measured values from presupposed values. 
The idea of a chain of values is not very original. Furthermore, it does not give 
a satisfactory account of the respective measurement, for it does not contain any 
information about the theories involved. Let me call a description of some 
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process of measurement complete, only if it gives the relevant sequence of 
measured values plus the equations (theories) that are applied in each step of the 
calculation. Again this idea of a complete description does not seem to be very 
original. However, it did not appear in the literature up to now, and mainly so for 
one reason (now becoming obvious): a prejudiced view of measurement that 
dissociates measurement too much from theory. Within the structuralist view, 
complete descriptions of measurement can be given easily. The concept of a 
chain of measurements and of a measurement graph (a sequence, respectively a 
graph of interrelated measuring models) provide simple and powerful descriptive 
tools .25 
It may be objected here that there is a still more strict notion of a complete 
description capturing also errors of measurement and experimental design. The 
important topic of errors of measurement has not yet been addressed from the 
structuralist point of view. It seems possible, however, to reformulate existing 
accounts in terms of measuring models and substructures. Such a reformulation 
might prove helpful, especially in cases of measurement in highly developed 
theories that may involve features of theory dynamics and of approximate com- 
parison of theories. The subtle picture of how errors of measurement come up 
together with theory provided by H. E. Kyburg Jr.26 is of particular relevance 
here. Furthermore, some general structuralist apparatus might be As 
far as experimental design is concerned, I do not think that this can be included in 
a systematic description of measurement. All the systematic features are some- 
how captured by the theories governing the process of measurement, any further 
features of special design being attached to special cases and in this sense being 
unsystematic. 
A third achievement of the structuralist view-closely related to the second 
one-is that it treats measurement and theory in the same model-theoretic way. 
The basic units of analysis are systems (represented by models), and investiga- 
tions aim at revealing their inner structure (represented by types and axioms) as 
well as their outer relations to other systems. In addition to "mere" models, 
measuring models are distinguished by their uniqueness properties. However, 
this does not prevent them from functioning in the network of theories much like 
ordinary models. This perspective is likely to prevent us from ascribing to 
measured values apreferred status of given, nonhypothetical items against which 
theories are tested, and it yields a better starting point for the investigation and 
understanding of how theory and measurement function and develop together. So 
much has become clear by now: The development and test of comprehensive 
theoretical networks do not fit into the simple picture of collecting independent 
25See (Balzer, 1985b, chap. IV) and (Balzer & Wollmershaeuser, 1986). 
26See (Kyburg, 1984) and his contribution to this volume. Although his two rules may 
be still controversial, the basic picture he provides is not. 
27See (Balzer et al. 1987, chap. VII). 
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data and then theoretically organizing them. There is much interplay between the 
development of theoretical pictures and what counts as data in a given state of the 
development. This interplay can be structured best when theory and data (mea- 
surement) are represented in the same way, as having equal rights. 
This brings me to some further topics not yet worked out, for the treatment of 
which the structuralist view seems to be promising. The first topic is theory 
development including features of measurement, test, and approximation. Up to 
now, pictures of theory development do not capture aspects of measurement, and 
if they include features of approximation at all, they do so (see footnote 27) just 
by blurring the idealized theoretical pictures. However, the real source of such 
fuzziness is of course the impossibility of exactly measuring numerical functions. 
The inclusion of measurement into the diachronic picture of theoretical develop- 
ment, therefore, not only will yield an explanation of why theories are only 
approximately true; it also will provide a frame for depicting the origins and 
changes of the degrees of accuracy relevant for each application of a theory at a 
given time. - 
A second promising topic is confirmation. There are the classical ideas about 
a choice between alternative hypotheses attached to the names of Bacon, Nicod, 
and Popper, and the ideas of Carnap and Hempel about degrees of confirmation 
of a hypothesis (theory) in a given structure. However, these ideas are intended to 
apply to one isolated hypothesis that is matched against an independently given 
data-base and given alternative hypotheses. Philosophers abandoned these ideas 
as inadequate for more comprehensive arrays of theory long ago, but only re- 
cently did some positive move occur, in the form of the "bootstrap view" of 
confirmation Glymour (1980) has put forward. Although this account in fact hits 
the central pattern underlying confirmation in large theoretical networks, it falls 
short of providing a global analogue to the idea of a degree of confirmation. The 
reason for this limitation again is the conceptual separation of measurement from 
theory. Glymour represented measurement by "computations," sequences of 
presupposed and measured values, the theories underlying the various steps 
being ignored. Yet as soon as theories are properly included in the picture- 
which means that measurement is treated within the structuralist view-the 
notion of a degree of confirmation for more comprehensive theoretical arrays can 
be attacked once again by combining bootstrap ideas with those of partial 
implication. 28 
A third promising topic is reference. Up to now, reference has been ap- 
proached merely from the side of philosophy and philosophy of language. The 
structuralist view of measurement yields an elegant conceptual frame for defining 
the referents of terms of scientific, extensional theories. This may form the basis 
for a precise, detailed theory of reference for empirical, extensional theories, that 
is, for a theory of reference suited for the philosophy of science. For example, 
28For the purely theoretical side of the issue that also is one-sided by neglecting 
measurement, see (Balzer et al., 1987, chap. VIII). 
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the referent of a numerical function in a theory is given as that assignment of 
numbers to real objects (which are represented by appropriate arguments in 
models of real systems) that is determined by the theoretical axioms, constraints, 
and interrelations as well as by the real systems to which the theory applies. The 
fact that, among the real systems, there usually are many measuring models for 
the function in question will often guarantee a unique referent, whereas the 
theoretical constraints provide for coherence.29 
I want to close by pointing to a problem central to the present account, namely 
that of drawing a demarcation between "mere" models of a theory and measur- 
ing models for some term of the theory. The crucial condition distinguishing 
measuring models from mere models is that of uniqueness of the function to be 
measured. However, as already noted, to require strict uniqueness would deprive 
the notion of a measuring model of practical interest, because usually the the- 
oretical laws alone do not imply such strict uniqueness. An adequate concept of a 
measuring model has to be formulated with a requirement of uniqueness up to 
some kind of transformation. There are different kinds of transformations one 
may consider; thus, the problem is to choose the "right" kind of transformation 
to be employed in the definition of a measuring model. This really is a problem 
of demarcation, because, if the transformations chosen are too general, we will 
not be able to determine the function considered in any interesting sense, and, 
therefore, we will not have a measuring model before us. If the transformations 
are chosen very narrowly, we may have a measuring model but one that is not 
interesting in connection with its corresponding theory, because it applies only to 
few and uninteresting real systems. 
In the section, Structuralist View of Measurement, this problem was 
"solved", or rather suppressed, by pretending an absolutely adequate class of 
transformations, adequate for all numerical functions-linear transformations. 
However, inspection of examples shows that each theory has its own adequate 
class of transformations. When determining distances in affine geometry, only 
dilatations are meaningful, whereas, in a fundamental determination of tem- 
perature, the full class of linear transformations is appropriate. In a determination 
of positions by means of classical mechanics, Galilei transformations might be 
suggested, because such transformations connect different frames of reference. 
In utility theory, the determination of utility in standard approaches30 proceeds 
29Compare (Balzer, 1985b, Sec. 23, 1987), and (Balzer, Lauth, Zoubek, 1989). 
30By "standard approaches," I here mean those exemplified in traditional economic 
literature like, (Henderson & Quandt, 1958). There is another approach originating from 
v. Neumann & Morgenstern (1947) regarding utilities as determined by preferences and 
probabilities ("beliefs") up to linear transformations that now has started to penetrate 
"standard" economic literature. Still a third view, represented by (Jeffrey, 1965), is worth 
mentioning (in order to show that the issue really is not settled) according to which utility 
together with probability are determined by means of preferences up to so-called 
"Goedel-Bolker" transformations. 
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only up to monotone transformations: By such procedures, only an ordering of 
the alternatives can be achieved, and the numerical values for utility are really 
not determined at all. From these considerations, one is tempted to jump to the 
conclusion that each theory for each of its terms determines the appropriate class 
of transformations to be used in the definition of the measuring models for that 
term. However, this view deprives the condition of uniqueness of any content. 
Each Ri is unique up to natural transformations, if by natural transformations we 
mean those that preserve the property of being a measuring model. Uniqueness is 
central to measurement proper; thus, a criterion is necessary that prevents the 
condition of uniqueness from becoming trivial. 
There are two lines of attacking the problem. First, formal considerations may 
be used to exclude certain kinds of transformations or invariances as inadmissible 
for a given method of measurement. Recently Luce and Narens31 achieved 
progress here. By introducing the concept of a scale type as consisting of a 
degree of uniqueness and a degree of homogeneity, they were able to show that, 
under special conditions (like the presence of a concatenation operation or the 
existence of some representation onto the reals), only certain, few scale types are 
possible. 
Second, by concentrating on the "positive", real-life cases of measurement 
up to certain transformations of scale, those cases in which no doubt is likely to 
occur, we see that there the transformations are completely determined by 
finitely many-actually very few-parameters, like two numbers in the case of 
linear transformations. Moreover, giving some particular value to any of these 
parameters has a straightforward, empirical meaning like choosing a particular 
object as unit or as origin. We, therefore, might say that some class of transfor- 
mations is admissible, iff it is determined by finitely many parameters, and if the 
choice of each parameter corresponds to a choice of some basic object in the 
model, that is, of some element of the base sets D l ,  . . . , D, of the model. Of 
course the meaning of "corresponds" here needs further elaboration, and a little 
reflection shows that a kind of reduction to qualitative comparison lurks behind 
it-much like that underlying the representationalist view. 
APPENDIX 
Proof of TI: (a) Let b E U, b' E U'. By Dl (a) (6), there are b,, . . . , b, E U 
such that b, o . . . o b, = b'. Suppose n r I. Then, for all i 5 n: bi < b' by Dl 
(a) (4) and (2). But also, by Dl  (a) (6), there are b;,  . . . , b&E U' such that b; 
o . . . o bk= b, which implies b,l <, b by Dl (a) (2) and (4). So b; <, b = bi < b' 
= b; by Dl  (a) (3, (i.e., b; < b;, which yields a contradiction with Dl (a) (2). 
So n = 1, (i.e., b = b, = b'), from which we obtain b = b' #. 
(b) Let x be a model with units U and x' a model with units U'. 
31Compare (Luce & Narens, 1985) and (Narens, 1985). 
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Lemma I For all b,, . . . , b,, b;, . . . , bkE  U: 
b , o  . . .  o b , b ; o  . . .  o b h i f f n = m .  
Proof of the Lemma: If n = m, the left-hand side follows from Dl (a) (2), (4), 
and (5) by induction with respect to n. Conversely, if without loss of generality m 
< n, then b;o . . . o b h =  b, o .  . . ob, < (b,o . . . ob,)o(b,+, o . . . o 
b,) = b, o . . . o b,, by the first part of the proof, and by Dl  (a) (2) and (4)#. 
Now let b E U, o(b) = p, wr(b) = 7, and a: = PIT > 0. Let a E D. By Dl 
(a) (5), there exist b,, . . . , b, E U and b;, . . . , b k E  U' such that (1) b, 
0 . .  . o b , = a b ; o . .  . o b h  
By Dl (a) (7.1) and part (a): w(bi) = w(b,l) and of(bi) = or(b,l) for all i 5 n and j 
5 m. This, together with (1) and Dl (a) (7.2), yields o(a) = n P = n o(b,) and 
o'(a) = mor(b) = m7. 
Applying Lemma 1 to U U U', we obtain from (1): n = m, so o(a) = n P = n a7 
= a n7 = ao '  (a)#. 
(c) Define o by o(b) = I for all b E U and o(a) = n, iff a = b, o . . . o b,, 
according to Dl (a) (6). Then Dl (a) (7) follows from Dl (a) (6) and Lemma 1, 
and uniqueness follows from (b) #. 
Proof of Z2: (a) See (Krantz et al., 1971), T1 p. 74 #. 
(b) We first need Lemma 2. 
Lemma 2 If D3 (a) (1) to (4) hold, then o is commutative. 
Proof: (Krantz et al., 1971), p. 78, lemma 3#. 
D3 (a) (2) follows from (i) and Dl (a) (2). By (iii), o is total, and associativity 
follows from (i) and Dl (a) (3). D3 (a) (4) follows from (i), (iii) and Dl (a) (4). In 
order to prove D3 (a) (5) let a,  b, c, d E DUX such that a < b. If c <, d, (5) holds 
for n = 1 by D3 (a) (4). So let d < c. If a o c < b o d, (5) holds for n = 1. 
Otherwise a o c > b o d (by D3 (a) (1) to (4), which are already proved. By (i), 
there is an x E X such that a ,  b, c, d E DX, and, by Dl (a) (6), there are a , ,  . . . , 
an(a), b,, . . . , bn(b,, c,, . . . , c ~ ( ~ ) ,  d l ,  . . . , dn(d) E Ux such that a ,  o . . . o 
an(,, = a and similarly for b, c, d. From a < b, it follows that a<" b, and from 
Lemma 1, we obtain that n(a) < n(b), i.e. b a ,  o . . . o a,(,, o b,(,,+, 
o . . . o b,(,,, and similarly from d < c, we obtain n (d) < n(c), i.e. c dl  
o . . . o d,(,, o c,(,,+ , o . . . o c,(,,. NOW let c - d: = c,(,,+, o . . . o c,(,, 
and b - a: = b,(,, + , o . . . o b,(,,. From a o c > b o d, Lemma 2, and Dl  (a) 
(4), we obtain that c - d > b - a. By (ii), there is an extension z E X of x and 
some n E N such that n(b - a) is defined in z, and c - d 5' n(b - a). By (iii) 
and (i), we find some extension u of z such that na and nb also are defined in u. 
From D3 (a) (1) to (4), Lemma 2, it follows, by straightforward calculation, that 
n(b - a) = nb - na where the latter entity is constructed like b - a above. In u, 
we then have c - d 5" nb - na which, by Lemma 2, implies na o c 5" nb o d. 
But then na o c _< nb o d, by the definition of UX#. 
Proof of T3: 
(b) Let mi: = m(pi) for i = 1,2,  3, Then D4 (a) (5) can be rewritten as z miwi 
( 1 )  i s 3  
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= 0. This is a homogeneous system of linear equations. Let W be the matrix (w,, 
w,, w3), Z: = {(m,, m,, m,) E R3/mi > 0 for 1 5 i 5 3) and L: = Z fl Kernel 
(W). By a theorem by Tucker (Tucker, 1956), Corollary 1A, D4 (a) (6) implies 
(2): The existence of a positive solution of (I). Now (1) has a unique (up to a 
positive factor) and positive solution iff Dim(L) = 1, but L is an open subset of 
Kernel (W), so Dim(L) = Dim(Kerne1 (W)). Therefore, (1) has a unique and 
positive solution, iff Dim(Kerne1 (W)) = 1. By a well known theorem of linear 
algebra: Dim(Kerne1 (W)) + Rank(W) = 3. So (3): (1) has a unique positive 
solution, iff Rank(W) = 2. By D4 (a) (6), Part 1, we have Rank(W) = 2, and 
from (3) and (2), we obtain that the solution of (1) is unique up to a positive 
factor#. 
Part (a) now follows from D4 (a) (7)#. 
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